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The Other Side of Religion
by
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*
Introduction
Religion and religious freedom hold a special place in the American
experience and in American constitutional law.1 The search for religious
freedom played a paramount role in the settling of the colonies and in the
founding of the Nation. Religious tradition is deeply embedded in our
cultural heritage.2 Americans are among the most religious people in the
world, 3 and religion holds an incalculable importance in their lives. 4
Religion forges community bonds, provides moral direction, and shapes
individual self-identity. 5 Most importantly, religion addresses the central
concerns of human existence: the search for meaning, understanding,
and truth.6
Religion's special status in American life has not, however, entitled
it only to special deference. There has been one area where religion has
been subject to special constraints. That area is "the public square" 7-
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.A. 1972, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Ira Lupu,
Frederick Gedicks, Douglas Laycock, Larry Alexander, Rodney Smith, Ned Foley, Dena Da-
vis, Rebecca Dresser, George Dent, James Lindgren, Erwin Chemerinsky, Hal Krent, and Mel
Durchslag for their helpful comments and powerful criticisms of earlier drafts of this Essay. I
am also indebted for the research assistance of Douglas Desjardins.
1. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup.
CT. REv. 83, 83-84.
2. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN IN THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11-12 (1965).
3. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 2 (1985).
4. Justice Douglas captured the pervasive importance of religion in the United States
when he wrote: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
5. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1115, 1164-66 (1988).
6. See, eg., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE COM-
PLETE JEFFERSON 946, 946-47 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943). The Bill is codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1986). In the Bill, Jefferson offered a search-for-truth rationale as sup-
porting the exercise of religion and the prohibition on the government's establishment of reli-
gion. Id.
7. See RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 10, 26 (1984).
the metaphorical location that hosts the process of public political deci-
sionmaking. In this arena, both formal and informal structures inhibit
religion's participation.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is the formal
constraint. It limits the extent to which religion may be benefitted or
endorsed by government action, even though other beliefs or ideas are
subject to no comparable limitations. 8 The informal constraint is the
general perception that religion and religious conviction are purely pri-
vate matters that have no role or place in the nation's political process. 9
While the informal constraint has no legal effect (and indeed there is no
question that those advocating religious beliefs have a complete right to
freely enter into the political debate under the First Amendment's
Speech Clause), 1° it has been used as a rhetorical objection to question
the propriety of religious involvement in matters of public controversy. 1
There has been much debate over whether the special constraints
upon religion's role in the public square are justified. The breadth of this
debate, however, has been narrow. Those arguing in favor of a greater
role for religion in the public square tend to emphasize only the beneficial
function of religion in society. Those on the other side rely primarily
upon the contention that religious beliefs are epistemologically unsuited
to the political process. Neither side, however, has investigated whether
there is something about the nature of religion itself that justifies the spe-
cial constraints placed upon it. 12 This Essay is an effort to introduce that
issue into the debate. Part I provides the necessary background. It
8. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657-58 (1992).
9. The line between the formal and informal constraints upon religion is obviously not
clear cut. Occasionally religion's participation in public decisionmaking, if too obviously suc-
cessful, may raise formal Establishment Clause concerns. Government actions whose purpose
is deemed to be religious are unconstitutional under current Establishment Clause standards.
E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56, 61 (1985).
10. E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941) (holding that a state law
requiring a special license to march in a parade was constitutional because it was not aimed at
any restraint of freedom of speech or religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940) (holding unconstitutional a law conditioning the solicitation of money for religious
causes upon a state determination as to what is a religious cause); see Douglas Laycock, To-
wards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1393 (1981); cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 626, 628-29 (1978) (Free Exercise Clause protects right of clergyman to run for
public office).
11. This rhetorical objection is ably described and criticized in Frederick M. Gedicks,
Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992) [hereinafter Gedicks, Public
Life].
12. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court came closest to discussing this issue when it alluded to
the "history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the
hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a
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briefly outlines the current attack on the special constraints placed upon
religion and explains why the efforts to defend those constraints on epis-
temological grounds are not persuasive. Parts II and III examine the
aspects of religion that potentially support a special constraint upon its
role in the public square. Part II proceeds from literature. It recounts
the story of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor to illustrate how the needs of
humanity can lead to the creation of a church, which in order to make
people happy, denies freedom and invites intolerance and persecution.
Part III parallels the analysis in Part II from the perspective of social
science. It examines the psychological and sociological forces inherent in
religious experience that can lead to intolerance and persecution. Part
IV draws upon the understanding of religion set forth in Parts II and III
in order to address whether the special constraints placed upon religion's
participation in the pubfic square are warranted.
The Essay concludes that imposing carefully circumscribed special
constraints upon religion's role in public decisionmaking is defensible de-
spite, or perhaps because of, religion's inestimable value to human free-
dom and existence.
I. Background
The legitimacy of imposing special constraints upon religion's in-
volvement in public decisionmaking has been forcefully attacked on a
number of counts. It has been argued that restricting the role of religion
in political decisionmaking (1) is artificial if not impossible; (2) undercuts
society's ability to make informed moral and political judgments; and (3)
sets forth an inappropriate dichotomy that forces religion and religious
values to be "privatized" or "marginalized" in a manner that demeans
religion's role in the life of the individual as well as in society at large. 13
The response to this attack has rested primarily on epistemological
grounds. It has been contended that because religious principles are
based on faith rather than reason, they are not commonly accessible to
policy to indoctrinate and coerce." 112 S. Ct. at 2658. The Court did not explain, however,
what might cause this phenomenon. Id
13. E.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Enduring Revolution: Law and Theology in the Secular
State, 39 EMORY L.J. 217, 247-51 (1990); Stephen L. Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and
Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 985-86, 992-93; Gedicks, Public Life, supra
note 11, at 678-81, 685-86; Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of
Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 19, 56-57, 72 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the
"Secular" Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEx. L. Rv. 955, 999-1007
(1989); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALrrY, PoLrrcs, AND LAW 57-73 (1988) (conclud-
ing "that the relation between morality and politics envisioned by liberal political philosophy is
impossible to achieve").
April 1993]
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the polity and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for political decision-
making. 14 According to this view, religion is an epistemologically infer-
ior belief system from which to construct norms of public behavior and
morality.
For a number of reasons, this argument is not persuasive. First, it is
descriptively inaccurate. Just as not all non-religious postulates and mo-
res depend on reason, not all religious principles derive from faith.' 5 Sec-
ond, the epistemology of the reason versus religion dichotomy is not
sound. Reason may be subject to the same sort of epistemological attack
as faith. 16 The belief that reason inspires moral or political truths is just
that-a belief.1 7 The acceptance of reason, in short, depends upon the
acceptance of assertions as to the epistemological superiority of reason
that are ultimately unverifiable.1 8 Third, even if faith can be epistemo-
14. There is a lack of unanimous opinion as to the degree to which religion should be
excluded. Compare BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 345-48
(1980) (asserting that "all of us [should] accept the discipline of dialogue and restrain the
temptation to destroy those whom we cannot convince") with KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 49-84 (1988) (explaining that in political deci-
sionmaking there are times "when religious convictions appropriately come into play and
when they do not"). But see NEUHAUS, supra note 7, at 248-64 (defending the value of religion
in the public debate); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 932, 937, 943-44 (1989) (same).
15. St. Anselm is responsible for the most famous attempt to prove rationally the exist-
ence of God. See ST. ANSELM'S PROSLOGION (M.J. Charlesworth trans., 1965). Thomas
Aquinas had slightly different views on religion and faith. He believed that reason was a pre-
requisite for faith. See 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 19-27 (Fathers of the Eng-
lish Dominican Province trans., 1920). For a more contemporary discussion on the
relationship between rationality and religion, see Myers, supra note 13, at 70-73.
16. See DUNCAN B. FORRESTER, BELIEFS, VALUES AND POLICIES 5 (1989); Fredrick M.
Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 139 (1991)
[hereinafter Gedicks, The Religious]; see also Myers, supra note 13, at 72 & n.306 (pointing out
that "rationality" can begin with diametrically opposed premises).
17. See Michael J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Reli-
gious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment", 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067,
1068 (1986) ("The liberal attempt to disqualify religious judgments or beliefs is an attempt to
privilege a particular conception or range of conceptions of rationality, and thus liberalism is
not at all as 'neutral' or 'impartial' as it aspires and advertises itself to be."); see also Sanford
Levinson, The Confederation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Jus-
tices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1077 n.90 (1990) (questioning distinctions between religious
and secular morality in philosophical discourse).
18. See FREDRICK M. GEDICKS & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FU-
TURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 115-31 (1991) ("In postmodern thought, the
Enlightenment project is a failure, having only succeeded in replacing worship of God with
worship of science."); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
24-41 (1949) (1748) (scientific knowledge is only a prediction of the future because it is based
on past experience; knowledge derived from experience does not absolutely determine what
will happen in the future); Gedicks, The Religious, supra note 16, at 137 (arguing that post-
modem rejection of objective truth refutes the "empirical argument for keeping religious dis-
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logically distinguished from reason, the conclusion that mores produced
by rational discourse are superior to those derived by faith seems arbi-
trary at best. Dialogue and accessibility do not assure beneficial results.19
Finally, the epistemological attack on religion suggests a hierarchy of
beliefs that is inconsistent with First Amendment Speech Clause juris-
prudence, which posits that all ideas are equal. 20
Ultimately the epistemological attack on religion does not support
special constraints upon religion's role in political decisionmaking. 21 If
such constraints are justified, they must stem from another source. In
the following sections, that source will be identified. Specifically, this
Essay asserts that the primary argument in favor of limiting religion's
role in the public square stems from the manner in which religion and its
followers may, at times, interact. It is the potential, and sometimes ac-
tual, dynamic of religion and not its epistemology that is problematic.
This thesis, however, has been recounted previously by story and it
is to that story I now turn.
I. The Grand Inquisitor
The Grand Inquisitor is a story within a story-a "poem" told by
one fictional brother to another in Dostoevsky's Brothers Karamazov.22
Ivan, the story's narrator, believes he is an atheist. Alyosha, the listener,
is a monk. The story describes Jesus' visit to Seville during the Spanish
Inquisition. Ivan introduces the tale as follows:
My story is laid in Spain, in Seville, at the worst time of the Inqui-
sition, when fires were lighted every day to the glory of God, and in the
splendid auto da fd the wicked heretics were burnt.
course out of public life"); Smith, supra note 13, at 1010-11 (both secular and religious belief
"may exhibit or lack generality, coherence, and regularity").
19. Smith, supra note 13, at 1008 n.290 (observing that there is "delicious irony" in the
argument that religious values are inaccessible to the general community, and then goes on to
replace these religious values with political theories that are accessible only to academics).
20. See, eg., Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1975) (holding that an ordinance
is unconstitutional because it impermissibly distinguishes between labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 23-26 (1975) (stating that the realization of the goals of the First
Amendment requires equality of expression). For this reason, I have suggested elsewhere that
religion is not entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause. See William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 320
(1991); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 388-89 (1990).
21. See Gedicks, The Religious, supra note 16, at 139 (arguing that secularism's exclusion
of religion from public life should not and cannot persist).
22. FYODOR DosroEvsKy, NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND AND THE GRAND IN-
QUISITOR at vii (Ralph E. Matlaw trans., 1960).
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... In His infinite mercy he came once more among men in that
human shape in which He walked among men for three years fifteen
centuries ago. He came down to the 'hot pavement' of the southern
town in which on the day before almost a hundred heretics had, ad
majorem gloriam Dei, been burnt by the cardinal, the Grand Inquisi-
tor, in a magnificent auto da f, in the presence of the king, the court,
the knights, the cardinals, the most charming ladies of the court, and
the whole population of Seville.2 3
The people recognize Jesus in Ivan's story. They are drawn to him;
they feel his compassion. They see him perform wondrous works: He
cures an old man from blindness and raises a small child from death. 24
These events are witnessed by the Grand Inquisitor, "an old man,
almost ninety, tall and erect, with a withered face and sunken eyes from
which a light like a fiery spark gleams."' 25 The Grand Inquisitor's re-
sponse is quick and startling. He orders Jesus' arrest:
He knits his thick gray brows and his eyes gleam with a sinister fire.
He holds out his finger and bids the guards take Him. And such is his
power, so completely are the people cowed into submission and trem-
bling obedience to him, that the crowd immediately makes way for the
guards, and in the midst of the tomblike silence that has suddenly
fallen they lay hands on Him and lead Him away. 26
The people, who only a moment before had lavished their adoration on
Jesus, now turn to the Grand Inquisitor: "The crowd instantly as one
man bows down to the earth before the old inquisitor. He blesses the
people in silence and passes on."'27
Jesus is imprisoned in "the ancient palace of the Holy Inquisi-
tion." 28 After night has fallen, he is visited in his cell by the Grand In-
quisitor. The Grand Inquisitor speaks:
"Is it You? You?" but receiving no answer, he adds at once, "Don't
answer, be silent. Indeed, what can You say? I know too well what
You would say. And You have no right to add anything to what You
had said of old. Why, then, have You come to hinder us? For You
have come to hinder us, and You know that. But do You know what
will happen tomorrow? I do not know who You are and I don't care
to know whether it is You or only a semblance of Him, but tomorrow I
will condemn You and burn You at the stake as the worst of heretics.
And the very people who today kissed Your feet, tomorrow at the
faintest sign from me will rush to heap up the embers of Your fire. Do
23. Id. at 121.
24. Id. at 122.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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You know that? Yes, maybe You know it," he added with earnest
reflection, never for a moment taking his eyes off the Prisoner.29
What follows is a remarkable dialogue, although perhaps soliloquy
is a better term, for Jesus does not speak. The only words are those of
the Grand Inquisitor. He addresses Jesus in anger, chastising him, blam-
ing him for humanity's suffering, charging him of "acting as though You
did not love them at all."'30
A. The Terrible Gift of Freedom
The Grand Inquisitor accuses Jesus of causing unbearable unhappi-
ness by offering humanity the 'terrible' gift of freedom.
You wanted man's free love. You wanted him to follow You freely,
enticed and captured by You. In place of the rigid ancient law, man
was hereafter to decide for himself with a free heart what is good and
what is evil, having only Your image before him as his guide.31
According to the Grand Inquisitor, humanity does not want free-
dom, but desires only happiness and salved conscience. Freedom, the old
man claims, is merely torment: "Did you forget that man prefers peace,
and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil?
Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but at
the same time nothing is a greater torture. '3 2 The Grand Inquisitor's
love of humanity and his need to save it from suffering lead him to decry
Jesus' terrible gift and to predict that the people will reject the freedom
that Jesus has offered: "They will cry aloud at last that the truth is not in
You, for they could not have been left in greater confusion and suffering
than You have caused, laying upon them so many cares and unanswer-
able problems. '33
The Grand Inquisitor proclaims that exorcising freedom from Jesus'
vision has been the task of the Church for fifteen hundred years. He
vaunts that the Church has completed this mission in the name of Jesus
himself.34 As Ivan explains in an aside to Alyosha, "[The Grand Inquisi-
tor] claims it as a merit for himself and his like that at last they have
vanquished freedom and have done so to make men happy."' 35 This ex-
plains why Jesus must be imprisoned. The Grand Inquisitor's task has
29. Id.
30. Id. at 126-29.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 124.
35. Id. at 125.
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been to save humanity from Jesus' offer of freedom.36 Jesus' return can
only serve to interfere with the old man's work.
B. Miracle, Mystery, and Authority
Equally significant to the Grand Inquisitor's renouncement of Jesus'
religion of freedom is what he and his church have given humanity in its
stead. The religion of the Grand Inquisitor is based not upon the individ-
ual's exercise of freedom but upon powers of miracle, mystery, and au-
thority-powers that have the ability to "capture the conscience" of
humanity. 37
According to the Grand Inquisitor, Jesus was offered these powers
when "the wise and mighty spirit in the wilderness" presented Him with
the three great temptations. 38 Jesus, however, refused because he knew
that his acceptance would prevent humanity from choosing him freely.
The Grand Inquisitor scolds Jesus for this decision. He argues that if
Jesus had yielded to the temptations, he would have saved humanity
from its unbearable unhappiness.
It has then fallen on the church to use the powers that Jesus refused:
"We have corrected Your work and have founded it upon miracle, mys-
tery and authority. ' 39 And humanity responded: "[M]en rejoiced that
they were again led like a flock, and that the terrible gift that had
brought them such suffering, was, at last, lifted from their hearts." 4
This explains a more subtle question in Ivan's story: why the crowd
does not resist when Jesus is arrested, and why it bows only to the Grand
Inquisitor even as its "Savior" is led away in chains. It is the church, and
not Jesus, that has mastered the power to satisfy humanity's conscience
and make humanity happy. It is the church, and not Jesus, that holds
humanity's allegiance.
C. The Competing Visions of Jesus and the Grand Inquisitor
Ivan's story presents two differing visions of religion and religious
belief. The religion that Jesus offers is predicated upon freedom: the
36. Id. at 123; id. at 132 (The Grand Inquisitor asks Jesus, "Why . . . have You come
now to hinder us?").
37. "There are three powers, only three powers that can conquer and capture the con-
science of these impotent rebels [humanity] forever, for their own happiness-those forces are
miracle, mystery and authority." Id. at 129-30.
38. Id. at 126, 130-31. The three temptations were turning stones into bread, casting
himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, and reigning over all the kingdoms of earth.
The Biblical accounts of the temptations are found in Matthew 4:1-11, Mark 1:12-13, and
Luke 4:1-13.
39. Id. at 132.
40. Id.
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choice between good and evil is to be made with a free heart. But this
freedom has its costs. It denies certainty; it creates anguish and suffering.
The religion of the Grand Inquisitor, on the other hand, is based upon
"miracle, mystery and authority. '41 Its concern is with humanity's cry
for happiness. Like the religion of Jesus, however, it too exacts a terrible
cost-it absolves humanity of its freedom.
It is tempting to view the Grand Inquisitor as representing the ma-
levolent religious leader and Jesus as depicting the good.42 The compari-
son, however, is more complex. The Grand Inquisitor's motivation is his
love for humanity.43 He wants humanity to be happy. He is willing to
suffer the burden of humanity's conscience in order to lessen the anxiety
of those weaker than himself. Jesus, on the other hand, while ostensibly
appealing to humanity's higher nature, is willing to sacrifice humanity's
happiness for an abstract goal that is beyond the reach of most individu-
als.44 Only the very strong can meet Jesus' demands. It is left to the
Grand Inquisitor and his church to care for the vast majority of people
who are unable to live with the anguish and uncertainty that Jesus' way
requires.
Neither the religious vision of Jesus nor the Grand Inquisitor are
then necessarily good or bad. With both there is selflessness and higher
purpose; with both there is serious cost. What does provoke a normative
response, however, are the background fires of the Inquisition and the
reaction of the crowd that submissively allows Jesus to be taken away.
Dostoevsky's point is clear; the religion of the Grand Inquisitor leads to
intolerance and persecution. Why it does so, however, is explained not
so much in what The Grand Inquisitor tells us about religion but rather
in what it reveals about humanity.45
41. Id. (emphasis omitted).
42. Dostoevsky's own view is ambiguous. At the end of the story, Jesus kisses the Grand
Inquisitor and the Grand Inquisitor, rather than sentencing Jesus to death, merely sends him
away. See id. at 139; see also GEIR KJETSAA, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER'S LIFE 341-
42 (Siri Hustvedt & Daniel McDuff trans., 1987) (discussing critics' views of whether Dostoev-
sky was "on the side of" the Grand Inquisitor or Jesus). But see ELLIS SANDOZ, POLITICAL
APOCALYPSE 246-47 (1971) (arguing that identifying Dostoevsky with the Inquisitor is
untenable).
43. At the close of the story, Ivan reminds his brother that the Grand Inquisitor faced the
temptations of the desert. "But yet all his life he loved humanity, and suddenly his eyes were
opened, and he saw that it is no great moral blessing to attain the perfection of the will ......
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 22, at 137.
44. Id. at 131-32.
45. According to Professor Kjetsaa, "[t]he story of the Grand Inquisitor has demon-
strated that it is not a question of what man wishes to be but what man is and is capable of
being." K.TETSAA, supra note 42, at 342.
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D. The Grand Inquisitor and the Danger of Religion
Why does humanity respond to miracle, mystery, and authority? In
Dostoevsky's tale, it is because of a troubling relationship between hu-
manity's fear of its own freedom and its need for spiritual and moral
solace. Humanity's greatest desire is to abandon its freedom and the re-
sponsibility of its own conscience: "I tell you that man is tormented by
no greater anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over
quickly that gift of freedom with which the unhappy creature is born."
46
But humanity also needs assurance that it has relinquished its freedom to
the right place. Religion's powers of miracle, mystery, and authority
serve as confirmation to the individual that she has acted correctly.
Humanity as described by Dostoevsky is thus not aspiritual.
Rather, it has everlasting spiritual cravings.4 7 It needs someone to wor-
ship, certainty as to the truth of its beliefs, and universal unity in its
beliefs.48 Nor is humanity amoral. It needs its conscience to be salved.
Indeed, it is humanity's passionate need to be morally and spiritually
right that makes its freedom so painful.
It is here that Dostoevsky's story reveals the aspect of religion that
necessitates a special caution. Religion and humanity have a potentially
dangerous symbiotic relationship. Humanity needs religion to alleviate
its spiritual and moral anxiety. Humanity wants to be led, to be told that
it is right, and to be relieved of the burden of its own conscience. In
order to respond to these needs and anxieties, religion must proclaim its
infallibility and universality. It must be dogmatic and authoritarian; for
if it were to express self-doubt, it would no longer possess the claim to
certainty that makes it attractive.
For similar reasons, religion must also attack the validity of other
beliefs. If those seeking religion need to feel certainty, then the presence
of conflicting beliefs can only interfere with that desire. As the Grand
Inquisitor explains:
[Humanity is] concerned not only to find what one or the other can
worship, but to find something that all would believe in and worship;
what is essential is that all may be together in it. This craving for com-
munity of worship is the chief misery of every man individually and of
all humanity from the beginning of time. For the sake of common
worship they've slain each other with the sword. They have set up
gods and challenged one another, "Put away your gods and come and
worship ours, or we will kill you and your gods!"
49
46. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 22, at 128-29.
47. Id. at 128.
48. Id. at 132-33.
49. Id. at 128.
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This passage, describing as it does, the genesis of religious persecu-
tion and intolerance is quite disturbing. But what is most troubling is
that the persecution and intolerance could not be ascribed to the malevo-
lence of religious leaders. The Grand Inquisitor's motivation, after all,
was his love for humanity and his desire to save humanity from unhappi-
ness. He did not act for personal wealth or gain. He was not personally
evil or cruel. 50
Yet, this realization only makes religion's dogmatism and intoler-
ance more frightening because it cannot be explained as merely the abuse
of power by misguided individuals. The point of Dostoevsky's story is
that the Inquisition was not for the benefit of the Church: It was for the
people.
IIH. Religion and the Nature of Humanity
Dostoevsky's story is, of course, a caricature. Not all religions nor
all religious beliefs fit the model of the church of the Grand Inquisitor.
Indeed, the Jesus character in the story is an eloquent testament to reli-
gion's decidedly non-authoritarian and non-persecutory side, the side of
religion that focuses on humanity's quest for truth and meaning. More-
over, even for those who choose not to follow the highly individualized
faith of Dostoevsky's Jesus, religion is not always authoritarian or intol-
erant. The religion of the Grand Inquisitor is not the only alternative to
the religion of Dostoevsky's Jesus.
The Grand Inquisitor also does not fully explore why humanity
seeks a religious outlet. The need for religion cannot be explained solely
as humanity's attempt to avoid the exercise of freedom and the responsi-
bility of individual conscience. To many, religious affiliation and belief is
a measure of altruism or humility; to others, it is part of community; and
to some, it just is.
Finally, although The Grand Inquisitor may be seen as a call for the
separation of church and state-indeed that is arguably the lesson of
Jesus' rejection of authority51-the role of religion in the political sphere
cannot be viewed as entirely negative. Religious communities may serve
50. Importantly, this explanation of the Grand Inquisitor's motivations comes not from
the Grand Inquisitor himself but from Ivan, the story's narrator. Id. at 137-38. The fact that
this depiction comes from Ivan suggests that the depiction of the Grand Inquisitor as selfless
rather than malevolent is what Dostoevsky intended.
51. SANDOZ, supra note 42, at 159-66.
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as intermediate groups that protect against totalitarian regimes.52 Reli-
gious values also provide moral foundations for political choices.53
Nevertheless, the church of the Grand Inquisitor is not purely fic-
tional. Rather, substantial social science literature indicates that Dos-
toevsky's story accurately captures what may be termed the "dark side"
of religion and religious belief-the side of religion that is inherently in-
tolerant and persecutory.54 It is this dark side of religion that has sur-
faced throughout the course of history and continues to play a prominent
role in contemporary world politics. It is this dark side of religion that
was well-known to the Constitutional Framers, including Thomas Jeffer-
son, who wrote: "I have never permitted myself to meditate a specific
creed. These formulas have been the bane and ruin of the Christian
church, which, through so many ages, made of Christendom a slaughter-
house and at this day divides it into castes of inextinguishable hatred to
one another." 55 It is this dark side of religion that supports the special
constraints placed upon its role in the political process.
A. The Dark Side of Religious Belief: Human Response to the Tremendum
The human spirit is driven to understand its role in the cosmos.
This drive is, in part, an aspect of humanity's desire for knowledge. Be-
cause humanity instinctively resists the idea that human existence is ran-
dom or incomprehensible, 56 it searches for meaning and order amidst
chaos.5 7 Indeed, as sociologist Peter Berger has indicated, in times of
52. See MARTIN E. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC 51 (1987); Fredrick M. Gedicks,
Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 115-
16; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 18. But see
Hank Johnston & Jozef Figa, The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives
on Mobilization Against Authoritarian Regimes, 27 J. FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 32, 42-43
(1988) ("the ecclesiastical hierarchy tends to exert a moderating influence on church involve-
ment in activities [in opposition to the state]").
53. NEUHAUS, supra note 7, at 20-22; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law-
making, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 378-80 (1985).
54. See infra Part IL.A; Jonathan K. Van Patten, In the End Is the Beginning: An Inquiry
into the Meaning of the Religion Clause, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 47 (1983) (citing Dostoevsky's
The Brothers Karamazov); cf Frederick Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy,
and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1579, 1590 (1987) (mentioning the "dark side" of religion).
55. 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 374 (A. Bergh ed., 1903) (letter to Rever-
end Thomas Whittemore).
56. See PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 56 (1967) ("Man cannot accept alone-
ness and he cannot accept meaninglessness.").
57. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, MEANING AND MORAL ORDER 25-26 (1987) (arguing that
the threat of chaos or "meaninglessness" shaped the social theories of both Weber and Durk-
heim: "With some form of alienation or estrangement being identified as the fundamental
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crisis, humanity's need for meaning may become "even stronger than the
need for happiness."5 8
Humanity's search for understanding is also based on fear. Human-
ity is plagued by existential anxiety. The knowledge of one's mortality
heightens an already intractable need to comprehend the purpose of life.
People are afraid that their lives may be no more than meaningless, insig-
nificant accidents or, at the other extreme, fearful that they exist accord-
ing to a divine, yet incomprehensible plan fraught with eternal
consequence.
The meaning that people seek contrasts with the chaos of existence.
The universe yields no answers. The person who, devoid of religious be-
lief, attempts to reconcile herself to this empty universe confronts a terri-
fying abyss beyond which lies only death and meaninglessness. The
source of the existential fear that grips humanity as a result of this en-
counter has been referred to as the "tremendum. '59 To some theorists,
this encounter is an inevitable part of existence.60 To others, the encoun-
ter occurs only when existing social structures break down and force the
individual to confront the universal void.61 In either case, the
tremendum manifests itself as chaos. 62
problem facing human existence, the highest calling of scholarship in the classical tradition
became that of finding ways to reunite subject and object.").
58. BERGER, supra note 56, at 58.
59. Rudolf Otto called the fear produced by a religious encounter "mysterium
tremendum." RUDOLF OTro, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 12-23 (John W. Harvey trans., 2d ed.
1950).
60. According to some theorists, chaos is the genesis of religious belief; believers create
religion in order to hide the chaos of existence. ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 8-14 (1965); OTTO, supra note 59, at 14-15.
61. Durkheim and Eliade hold a more intricate view of the relationship between chaos
and religious belief. To them, unlike Otto, chaos does not serve as the genesis of religious
belief. Rather, the threat of chaos works to entrench the believer in pre-existing religious struc-
tures. The greater the threat that chaos poses, the more intricate the religious structure. See
generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 21-33 (J.
Swain trans., 1965) (discussing the effects of the threat of chaos on belief systems); MIRCEA
ELIADE, THE SACRED AND PROFANE 31, 47-50 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1959) (discussing the
development of religious and magical "defenses" to threats to order).
62. The tremendum also represents the possibility of God or, more accurately, the fear
induced by the realization that one's existence is insignificant in relation to an omnipotent God
beyond human understanding. For example, the Old Testament passage in which Abraham
perceives himself as no more than "dust and ashes" in the face of God is cited by Otto to
support the idea that confrontation with the Holy makes people recognize their own insignifi-
cance. OTro, supra note 59, at 9. Annie Dillard has stated this idea in more colloquial terms:
The churches are children playing on the floor with their chemistry sets, mixing up a
batch of TNT to kill a Sunday morning. It is madness to wear ladies' straw hats and
velvet hats to church; we should all be wearing crash helmets. Ushers should issue
life preservers and signal flares; they should lash us to our pews. For the sleeping god
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B. Religion as a Response to the Tremendum
Religion and religious belief may be explained, at least in part, as a
protection against the tremendum. 63 But the relationship is complex 64
On the one hand, the believer is concerned with the existential problems
raised by the tremendum. On the other hand, the believer seeks religion
to shield herself from the tremendum 65 because facing it directly, without
the protection of any religious belief, is so disturbing.66
Religion protects the believer from the tremendum through doc-
trine67 and ritual.68 These devices work to create what James Breech has
termed a "holding mode" of consciousness that functions by allowing the
believer to anchor herself to what she sees as a stable and comprehensible
God.69 By substituting doctrine and ritual for a naked encounter with
the tremendum she is able to construct a sense of order and security that
may wake someday and take offense, or the waking god may draw us to where we
can never return.
ANNIE DILLARD, TEACHING A STONE TO TALK: EXPEDITIONS AND ENCOUNTERS 40-41
(1982).
63. See Orro, supra note 59, at 14 ("It is this feeling [mysterium tremendum] which,
emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire religious devel-
opment in history."); see also GOODENOUGH, supra note 60, at 1-29; Bronislaw Malinowski,
Magic, Science and Religion, in SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND REALITY 1, 32 (J. Needham ed.,
1925) (using the fishing practices of the Trobriand Islanders as an example of ritual that or-
ders the terror of existence: "It is most significant that in the Lagoon fishing, where man can
rely completely upon his knowledge and skill, magic does not exist, while in the open-sea
fishing, full of danger and uncertainty, there is extensive magical ritual to secure safety and
good results.").
64. The paradox of religion is that it allows the believer to avoid the tremendum by
ostensibly confronting it. GOODENOUGH, supra note 60, at 1-29.
65. An exception to this approach is taken by Dostoevsky's Jesus, who asks the individ-
ual to deal with the tremendum by embracing it. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 22, at 126-34; see
also T.S. ELIOT, East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 123, 126 (1971) ("I said
to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you/Which shall be the darkness of God.").
66. The terrifying experience of confronting God is a consistent religious theme.
Throughout the history of religions, there are few accounts of believers directly encountering
the Sacred. Even when the Deity is revealed to the faithful they never directly see God be-
cause this vision is so horrifying. In Greek mythology, for example, when Zeus descended to
earth he would always disguise himself. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 41, 79, 298
(1969). In the Old Testament, God does not speak to Moses or Job directly, but does so out of
a burning bush or a whirlwind. See Exodus 3:2; Job 38:1. In the New Testament, God comes
in human form to save Humanity. In the Koran, the angel Gabriel first visits the prophet
Mohammed in a dream. THE KORAN INTERPRETED 1:40 (Arthur J. Arberry trans., 1955).
67. The broad definition for doctrine includes virtually all aspects of religious teaching
and explanation, including parables and symbols as well as specific tenets.
68. See VICTOR R. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUC-
TURE 195-99 (1969); Max Gluckman, Les Rites de Passage, in ESSAYS ON THE RITUAL OF
SOCIAL RELATIONS 1, 1-52 (Max Gluckman ed., 1962).
69. JAMES BREECH, THE SILENCE OF JESUS 46 (1983).
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effectively hides the tremendum.70 The religious belief system, in es-
sence, provides a psychological defense against overwhelming feelings of
insignificance and chaos.71
That the believer needs to shield herself from the tremendum in this
manner is often reflected in the structure of organized religion. 72 Insulat-
ing the believer from the terror of God, for example, is a common reli-
gious pattern. Organized religion often places one intermediary or
several layers of intermediaries between God and the believer. The first
layer often takes the form of the prophet, who is often described as a
descendant, an incarnation, or a representative of God. The prophet and
the worshipper may be divided by yet another layer of divinity-the
priest, who serves as the interpreter of God's message.
Doctrine and ritual, which may work with a priest or independently,
are also critical components in insulating the believer from the
tremendum. In the initial stages of any religion, religious doctrine begins
as a way of providing insight into the terror of God. The doctrine un-
folds from the disciples' explanation of the words of the prophet who has
purportedly confronted the tremendum directly. 73
As religious doctrine develops, its role in the religion and in the ad-
herent's belief system becomes more pervasive. This is partially due to
the natural maturing process of any organization, but it is also due to the
inherent power of the doctrine. The more rigid and expansive the doc-
trine, the more the believer is shielded from the tremendum. Eventually,
because of the strength of its appeal, doctrine replaces God as the center
of the religious experience. 74
70. See DURKHEIM, supra note 61, at 21-33; ELIADE, supra note 61, at 64-65; GOOD-
ENOUGH, supra note 60, at 7.
71. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 56, at 53-80 (analyzing the ways divergent groups have
built belief structures to address their anxieties, needs, and problems).
72. Cf DEAN M. KELLY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE GROWING 83 (new &
updated ed. 1977).
73. The prophet is generally a person who has rejected established doctrine as vestigial or
corrupt. See generally MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 46-59 (Ephraim Fischoff
trans., 1963) (discussing religion's doctrinal development).
74. Religious doctrine is only seen as valid for a discrete amount of time. When a reli-
gious practice begins to lose meaning, the natural response is to shore up its structure. Eventu-
ally, however, new belief systems rise to challenge the old. See BERGER, supra note 56, at 29-
52.
A classic example of this phenomenon is Martin Luther's split with the Catholic Church.
Luther believed that Catholic doctrine had become tired and corrupt and had replaced Jesus as
the object of devotion. Accordingly, he sought to reinfuse God back into Christianity. Orro,
supra note 59, at 94-108.
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A similar process occurs with respect to ritual. Ritual is initially
created to memorialize the prophet's insight and enthusiasm. 75 As the
religion matures, the ritual becomes more rigid and central to the reli-
gious experience. Eventually, people forget how the ritual connects them
to the divine. Ritual ceases to be a vehicle for experiencing God and
instead becomes an end in itself. At this point, the meaning of the ritual
is lost and the rites become merely comforting obligations. 76
As described thus far, the believer's devotion to religion, while inter-
esting, is not problematic. This devotion becomes problematic when the
believer is faced with competing beliefs or ideas that are inconsistent with
her belief structure. Because fear is a primary motivation for the adop-
tion of a belief structure, the believer may be upset by any suggestion that
her adopted belief system is fallible. The attack on an individual's beliefs
does no less than threaten to plunge her world into chaos and expose her
to the pain and terror of an uncertain universe.
As a result, the believer's response may be to overcompensate by
clinging passionately to her religious structure. This means, at the least,
that she is unlikely to be open to discussing competing belief systems. As
Breech explains, the "holding mode" of consciousness requires closing
oneself off to new insight.77 In more extreme circumstances, believers
may respond with religious persecution.78 Because the forces that assault
a believer's religious structure are so fundamentally upsetting, believers
may see these forces as threatening evils that must be eliminated. The
prophet that rises to challenge established doctrine and ritual may be
branded a heretic. Those who ascribe to other belief systems may be
classified as infidels who need to be purged or converted in the name of
God. As Eliade wrote:
Since "our [the believer's] world" is a cosmos, any attack from without
threatens to turn it into chaos. And as "our world" was founded by
imitating the paradigmatic work of the gods, the cosmogony, so the
75. Victor W. Turner, Passages, Margins, and Poverty: Religious Symbols of Communi-
ties, in HIGH POINTS OF ANTHROPOLOGY 510, 514 (Paul Bohannon & Mark Glazer eds., 2d
ed. 1988) ("This primal impetus [the enthusiasm of the prophet] . . . soon attains its apogee
and loses its impetus; as Weber says, 'charisma becomes routinized,' and the spontaneous
forms of communitas are converted into institutionalized structure, or become routinized,
often as ritual.").
76. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 150-51 (enlarged
ed. 1968).
77. See BREECH, supra note 69, at 43-50.
78. WUTHNOW, supra note 57, at 119-44 ("Any deviation from conventional expecta-
tions or any ambiguity in the face of novel circumstances creates uncertainties not only for the
immediate actors in the situation but also for the larger society. Public rituals such as witch
trials provide a means of coping with this uncertainty.")
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enemies who attack it are assimilated to the enemies of the gods, the
demons .... "Our" enemies belong to the powers of chaos.79
IV. Are Special Constraints Advisable?-Lessons From a
Privatized Culture
The previous Sections establish that religion has its dark side. This
dark side, moreover, has the potential to be a powerfully destructive
political force. It may, for example, harm the process of political deci-
sionmaking. A believer who sees those who oppose or question her be-
liefs as aligned with the "powers of chaos" is likely to treat the public
square as a battleground rather than as a forum for debate. Religion, if
unleashed as a political force, may also lead to a particularly acrimonious
divisiveness among different religions. Those religions that are accused
of representing the powers of chaos are likely to react with similar vehe-
mence in denouncing their attackers. Finally, and most problematically,
religion's participation in the political process can produce dangerous re-
sults: Fervent beliefs fueled by suppressed fear are easily transformed
into movements of intolerance, repression, hate, and persecution. There
are, in short, substantial reasons for exercising caution with respect to
religious involvement in the public square.80
Yet, if religion poses the threats to the political process suggested
above, then why have these threats not materialized in United States his-
tory?81 Undoubtedly, one reason is demographics. The religious diver-
79. ELIADE, supra note 61, at 47-48. Whether these enemies come from inside or outside
the religious tradition, they threaten the established religious order. Wuthnow notes that here-
tics can come from inside the tradition. "Catholics did not round up Protestants and accuse
them of heresy, nor Protestants, Catholics. Each group found subversives within its own
camp, not traitors who were explicitly allied with the enemy, but weak souls endangering the
solidarity of the total community by practicing sorcery." WUTHNOW, supra note 57, at 117.
80. Of course, religion is not the only source of doctrinal rigidity and persecution of
dissent. The secular ideologies of communism and fascism, for example, have shown that
religion does not have a monopoly on either the strength of its ideological hold or the genera-
tion of ideological persecution. Therefore, the constraints applied to religious participation in
the public square might also be applicable to secular "non-diaogic" beliefs. Cf. Daniel 0.
Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(arguing for exclusion of non-dialogic religious beliefs from political decisionmaking).
On the other hand, religion's unique relationship to one of humanity's deepest fears sug-
gests that it possesses an inherent volatility that secular ideologies do not. Moreover, the argu-
ment that there are special concerns posed by religion's involvement in politics is buttressed,
rather than weakened, by the realization that nationalism may also pose the risk of intolerance
and persecution. Nationalism arguably approaches religion in its ability to maintain a fervent
hold on its adherents. Therefore, keeping religion out of the political sphere assures that these
powerful forces do not combine and increase their dangers.
81. The short answer is that the history of religion in the United States is not unblem-
ished. American religion readily established that it was not immune to the forces of intoler-
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sity and pluralism of the United States make appeals to religious
intolerance politically inexpedient. As Professor Gedicks has argued, a
politician seeking to command a majority cannot seek the support of only
one religious group.82
But it may also be that the special constraints upon religious partici-
pation in the public square have been effective. The Establishment
Clause and the cultural tendency to view religious involvement in politics
with suspicion (what has been referred to in this Essay as the informal
constraint upon religion) may have served to minimize religious strife,
intolerance, and divisiveness. s3
This is not to deny that religion has been an important political
force from time to time in American history.8 4 But religion has been
carefully solicitous of the notion that there is an appropriate boundary
between church and state.8 5 Indeed, the commitment to limiting the role
of religion in politics is so strong that even those who argue that religion
has been improperly excluded from the public square seem to concede
that religion's involvement in the political sphere must be approached
cautiously.86
ance and xenophobia in both the anti-Mormon movement of the nineteenth century and the
anti-Catholic movement in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 61-63. For a brief history of the Catholic
struggle in the United States, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628-30 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring). For an example of a particularly harsh anti-Mormon decision, see Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1889) (upholding a restriction denying the right to vote to those
having a religious belief in polygamy).
82. Gedicks, The Religious, supra note 16, at 121-22 ("A politician who needed votes
from a theologically diverse electorate could succeed only if he used a language that appealed
to all without offending any.").
83. But see id. at 139 (contending that the use of American history is a "curious" argu-
ment for secularized politics because secularism is recent).
84. Examples of instances in which religion has had a profound effect include the anti-
slavery movement, the Civil Rights movement, the temperance movement, and the abortion
movement (both pro-choice and anti-choice).
85. Robert Wuthnow has concluded:
What both sides [evangelicals and liberals] recognized, of course, was that the sym-
bolic boundary between morality and politics was crucial. If the boundary was
blurred, and if the category of morality was allowed to spill over into the public
domain, then evangelicals had a right to take action and to do so with moral convic-
tion. If the boundary was clear and impermeable, keeping morality in the private
domain, then evangelicals were merely meddling in matters that had better be left to
those who knew more about politics.
ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 211 (1988).
86. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1666-69 (1989) (discussing the limits of the religion clauses);
Gedicks, The Religious, supra note 16, at 144 (acknowledging "risk" involved in including
religious ideas in public debate).
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It has been suggested that this argument claims too much and that
the tradition of separation in American culture has meant only the "insti-
tutional" separation of church and state and not a full "secularized poll-
tiCs." '87 According to this view, while institutional separation may have
helped to create a non-divisive religious climate, secular politics is too
recent a phenomenon to have been a contributing factor.88 It is difficult
to see, however, how acknowledging the benefits of the institutional sepa-
ration of church and state does not cede the greater point that special
constraints upon religion are justifiable. Recognizing the merits of this
separation certainly admits that the injection of religion into politics can
be problematic. More broadly, it necessarily supports special constraints
on the way religious ideas are presented in the public square. After all,
where does the improper participation of institutional religion end and
the advocacy of that religion's specific beliefs begin?89 The answer, of
course, is that there is no clear line. Therefore, those wishing to avoid
charges of improperly bringing religion into the public square must be
careful in the way they characterize their political goals. Particular posi-
tions cannot be presented as institutionally required or as theologically
right. Instead, they must appeal to more general political or social inter-
ests. The advocacy of positions, in short, must be accomplished without
the passion or vehemence of religious imperative.
In the end, then, the only question in dispute is when should reli-
gion's participation in the public square be limited? Should religion be
invited to fully participate in the public square unless special circum-
stances dictate otherwise? Or should religion's undiluted participation in
the public square be seen as normally inappropriate?90
In deciding this question, one additional factor should be consid-
ered-the possible effect of special constraints on the religious believer.
The argument thus far has stressed the external aspect of the special con-
straints upon religion-the control of religious intolerance from without.
There is, however, a beneficial internal effect as well.
The notion that religion should be "privatized" may quiet religious
fervor. If religion is seen as private and not universal, there is less imper-
ative to conquer the religious beliefs of others. Instead of viewing the
87. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 86, at 1615-25; Gedicks, The Religious, supra note
16, at 116-19, 139; Smith, supra note 13, at 962-71.
88. See Gedicks, The Religious, supra note 16, at 139; Smith, supra note 13, at 971-79.
89. It is particularly problematic to make this determination today when the advocacy of
any view is so expensive that it often requires major institutional support.
90. As noted previously, religion and those espousing religious beliefs have a clear First
Amendment right to participate in the political process. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text. The question is whether this participation can be subject to rhetorical objection.
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religious beliefs of others as a challenge to an individual's belief structure,
the individual who accepts privatization sees others' beliefs as routine
and non-threatening. 91 The only threat occurs when others violate the
privatization norm by seeking to use the public square for their own reli-
gious purpose.92
A second consideration stems from an understanding of intolerance.
In Abrams v. United States,93 Justice Holmes argued that a logical result
of deep conviction is intolerance. 94 As Dean Bollinger has added, failing
to attempt to silence what one believes to be false might be seen as a sign
of weak conviction. 95 If this is so, then based upon the psychology un-
derlying religious belief, the believer's motivation to silence threatening
views should be particularly strong. As we have seen, the fear of uncer-
tainty leads some individuals to seek to impose their beliefs with a sense
of fervency. 96 To the zealous adherent, intolerance and persecution be-
come, in a sense, the measure of her commitment to her religious beliefs.
If, however, external limitations dictate that imposing one's beliefs
upon others is not a viable political option, the believer would not feel
that she is exhibiting weakness of conviction in declining to take political
action to further her political goals. In this manner, the principle that
politics is generally off-limits to religion may have the salutary effect of
diluting the urge to be intolerant. On the other hand, if the cultural
norm suggests that religion and politics should not occupy separate
spheres, the believer may feel she must test her commitment by seeking
to politically vindicate her beliefs or by urging her religious leaders to do
91. In a sense, the "belief' in toleration becomes internalized as a part of the adherent's
religious belief structure. Interestingly, Locke advocated that religious toleration be extended
only to those religions that adopted toleration as one of the tenets of their faith. John Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1 (London 1823); see also
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of.Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1514-15 (1990).
92. Indeed, this is yet another reason why the breakdown of the privatization norm is so
dangerous. Even those religious groups that would normally be unlikely to enter into the
political debate might choose to do so if they saw other religious groups actively utilizing the
political processes in order to gain governmental imprimatur for their religion and their reli-
gious beliefs. See Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 839-41 (1983) (suggesting that battles like those between religious groups who
contested the content of England's The Book of Common Prayer would accompany an Ameri-
can attempt to draft a sectarian school prayer).
93. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
94. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law
and sweep away all opposition.").
95. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 61-63 (1986).
96. Believers may feel motivated to impose their beliefs on others because they fear ap-
pearing uncertain about their beliefs. Id. at 61-64.
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so. In this latter instance, the public square becomes a religious free-for-
all.
Hopefully, the lesson is clear. Religious adherents are unlikely to
exercise self-restraint in entering the public square if the prevailing social
norm is that it is acceptable to forego such self-restraint. The dynamic of
intolerance suggests that the erection of a presumptive barrier against
religious participation in the public square is defensible.
Conclusion
Special constraints upon religion in the public square are warranted.
They are warranted, however, not because of any epistemological second-
class status of religious ideas, but because of the way in which religion
and humanity potentially interact. Religion is one of the most important
forces in society. It provides immeasurable benefits to both humanity
and the individual. But religion cannot be greeted in the public square
solely with celebration; it must also be greeted with caution.

